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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's appellate ruling affirming the 
magistrate's order suppressing evidence of the results of a blood alcohol 
concentration ("BAC") test. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The state charged Derek Michael Arrotta with misdemeanor DUI. (R., p. 
9.) Arrotta filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a blood 
draw. (R., pp. 37-41.) In relation to that motion, the magistrate made the 
following findings of fact: The officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Arrotta for 
driving with his windows obstructed by snow. (Tr., p. 111, Ls. 19-24.) Shortly 
after the initial stop the officer developed reasonable suspicion and then probable 
cause to believe that Arrotta was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p. 
111, L. 24 - p. 112, L. 6.) Arrotta refused to submit to a breath test after being 
read the legal advisory. (Tr., p. 112, Ls. 7-10, 19-23.) The officer then obtained 
a blood sample for evidentiary testing. (Tr., p. 112, L. 24 - p. 113, L. 2.) 
Rejecting the argument that the blood draw was done by implied consent, the 
magistrate suppressed the evidence, stating the state may not "use implied 
consent as an exception to the application of the Fourth Amendment warrant 
requirement." (Tr., p. 118, Ls. 13-19, p. 121, L. 20 - p. 122, L. 1, p. 124, L. 22-
p. 125, L. 1; R., p. 65.) 
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The state appealed to the d court. (R., pp. 67-69.) The district court 
affirmed the suppression order. (R., pp. 108-19.) The state appealed. (R., pp. 
121 .) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by affirming 
consent is a valid exception the 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Affirming The Magistrate's Conclusion That Implied 
Consent Is Not A Valid Exception To The Warrant Requirement 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate concluded that the state may not "use implied consent as 
an exception to the application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement." 
(Tr., p. 118, Ls. 13-19.) The district court affirmed, concluding that Idaho's 
implied consent law "is a nullity when it comes to warrantless searches." (R., p. 
118.) The decisions of these courts are in direct conflict with precedent of the 
Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States. The district 
court erred by affirming the magistrate's erroneous order suppressing evidence 
of blood alcohol content acquired by implied consent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a 
suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly 
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 
(2009). On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borely v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171,176,233 P.3d 102,107 (2010) (citing 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126, 219 P.3d 448, 
450 (2009); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670,183 P.3d 758 (2008)). 
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C The District Court Erred By Concluding That Implied Consent Is Not A 
Viable Exception To The Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
"A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain 
special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. 
Kerley, 134 Idaho 870,873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); see also State v. Ferreira, 133 
Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999).) Consent is such an 
exception to the warrant requirement, and may be implied under Idaho's implied 
consent statute. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 
(2007); State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,712-13, 184 P.3d 215, 218-19 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
This case is indistinguishable from Diaz. Both Diaz and Arrotta verbally 
refused the requested blood draw. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 301, 160 P.3d at 740. 
(Compare Tr., p. 112, Ls. 19-21.) The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged 
Diaz's argument that there was no exigency that would justify the warrantless 
blood draw, but that was "not the lone applicable exception here; consent is also 
a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement." kL at 302, 160 P.3d at 
741. "Because Diaz had already given his implied consent to evidentiary testing 
by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw. Without 
addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw, we hold that the 
seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement." kL at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. (Compare Tr., p. 123, L. 25 - p. 124, 
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L. 15 (finding Arrotta's conduct of driving and the officer's probable cause 
brought Arrotta within the scope of the implied consent law).) Because the 
procedure was "done in a medically acceptable manner and without 
unreasonable force" the police acted reasonably "[u]nder the totality of the 
circumstances." .tst (Compare Tr., p. 122, L. 17 - p. 123, L. 15 (finding that 
blood draw done in medically acceptable manner without force).) 
Nor is Idaho precedent the only word on the subject of implied consent. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the implied consent 
exception as well. Implied consent laws are among the "broad range of legal 
tools" used to to enforce drunk-driving laws. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 
1552, 1565-66 (2013). Implied consent license suspension procedures do not 
violate due process. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983). Likewise, 
evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood test under implied consent laws 
is constitutionally admissible evidence of his guilt. North Dakota v. Neville, 459 
U.S. 553 (1983). If anything short of voluntary consent for a blood draw is 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment, as held by the lower courts in this case, it is 
inconceivable that suspending a driver's license for exercising that constitutional 
right is consistent with due process. It is equally inconceivable that exercising a 
constitutional right to withhold consent would be admissible evidence of guilt. 
The lower courts' opinions that implied consent is not a valid Fourth Amendment 
exception is irreconcilable with this Supreme Court precedent. 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent, which must be 
followed "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be 
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unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious 
principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 
43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 
655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 
P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). The district court's conclusion that implied consent is not 
a valid exception to the warrant requirement is contrary to directly applicable 
precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and is inconsistent with precedents of the 
Supreme Court of the United States and is therefore erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests that the district court's appellate decision affirming the 
magistrate's order suppressing the evidence obtained by the blood draw be 
reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of March, 20 
KENNETH K. JORG EN 
Deputy Attorney GeMer 
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